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Newsome: Mediating Disputes

ARTICLE
MEDIATING DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF
TROUBLED COMPANIES—DO IT SOONER
RATHER THAN LATER
THE HONORABLE RANDALL J. NEWSOME *
My first employer after law school, U.S. District Judge Carl B.
Rubin,1 was fond of saying that only crazy or desperate people take cases
to trial—everyone else settles. He may have been exaggerating a little,
but what was true in the 1970’s is still true today: the overwhelming bulk
of all lawsuits in all courts settle before trial. That is no less true in
bankruptcy court. Particularly in large chapter 11 cases, compromise is
king. The shortest way to chapter 7 liquidation is to try to litigate your
way into a chapter 11 plan. Generally speaking, if you cannot cut a deal
with your major creditors, you cannot get a chapter 11 plan confirmed,
and the business cannot be reorganized.

*

The Honorable Randall J. Newsome (Ret.), a mediator with JAMS San Francisco, served
as a federal bankruptcy judge in Ohio and California for twenty-eight years, including six years as
chief bankruptcy judge for the Northern District of California. He received his B.A., summa cum
laude, from Boston University, and his J.D. from University of Cincinnati College of Law.
© 2012 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. The original version of this article
appeared in the June 13, 2011 issue of the Bloomberg Law Reports—Bankruptcy Law, Vol. 5 Issue
24. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not of Bloomberg Finance L.P. These
discussions are for informational purposes only. They do not take into account the qualifications,
exceptions and other considerations that may be relevant to particular situations. These discussions
should not be construed as legal advice, which has to be addressed to particular facts and
circumstances involved in any given situation. Any tax information contained herein is not intended
to be used, and cannot be used, for purposes of avoiding penalties imposed under the United States
Internal Revenue Code. Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliated entities do not take responsibility
for the content contained herein and do not make any representation or warranty as to its
completeness or accuracy.
1
On April 29, 1971, Judge Carl B. Rubin was nominated by President Richard M. Nixon to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio where he served until his death on August 2,
1995.
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Over the last several years, there has been much academic debate on
the subject of “vanishing trials”—whether the settlement rate in
bankruptcy and other courts is accelerating, and whether that is a healthy
trend for our justice system.2 A more interesting question is why
disputes in chapter 11 cases are not resolved sooner. Why does it take so
much time and so much money for parties to settle their differences and
arrive at a consensual chapter 11 plan?
There certainly are ample financial incentives for settling early in
the case. The most obvious inducement is that a chapter 11 debtor is, by
nature, a wasting resource. The longer it remains in bankruptcy, the less
value is available to pay creditors. Although this has always been true,
the fact is that the chapter 11 process has become far too expensive. The
problem is not merely the hourly rates and the number of hours billed,
but the number of entities employed by the estate and how each of those
entities staffs the case. The fee allowance process was intended to be
self-regulating under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 through objections by
parties in interest and decisions on those objections by the courts.3 That
self-regulation simply has not materialized. One of the stated missions
of the United States trustees (the U.S. Justice Department officials
charged with overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases) is to
monitor fee applications and object to them if appropriate. But the
United States trustee program does not have the resources to perform this
task effectively, and other methods of addressing this problem, such as
appointment of fee examiners and fee committees, have been equally
ineffective.
Although bankruptcy judges have an independent responsibility to
review fee applications, the judges in New York and Delaware—the two
principal venues for large chapter 11 filings—have little, if any, time to
hear adversary proceedings and other contested matters, much less slog
their way through mountains of time sheets. Indeed, given the size of
their case loads, it is a wonder they can function at all. The bankruptcy
court for the District of Delaware has six full-time judges and one parttime visiting judge. Between March 31, 2009 and March 31, 2010, 1355
business chapter 11 cases were filed in that district.4 During that same

2

See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 913, 929 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 498-99 (2004).
3
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 330 (Westlaw 2012).
4
U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES
COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING
MARCH
31,
2010
tbl.F-2
(Mar.
2010),
available
at
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/0310_f2.pdf.
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period, a staggering 3,349 adversary proceedings were filed, an increase
of almost fifty percent over the previous year.5 The eleven judges of the
bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for
such cases as Lehman Brothers, General Motors and Chrysler, are
equally overwhelmed. Between March 31, 2009 and March 31, 2010,
1513 business chapter 11 cases were filed in that district.6 During that
same period, 2945 adversary proceedings were filed, an increase of some
168 percent over the previous year.7
Assuming (but in no way conceding) that scorched-earth litigation
is ever a cost-effective, productive strategy for obtaining a desired result,
there is no room for such a strategy in these two districts. The judges
have neither the time nor the patience to provide the close judicial
oversight that heated litigation battles require. Moreover, the lack of
judicial resources to hear the case when it is finally ready for trial plays
into the hands of those benefiting from delay.
Early resolution of disputes is essential if a claimant seeks to
recover the greatest value in the shortest possible time. Engaging a
mediator at the front end of a dispute, rather than after hundreds of
thousands or millions of dollars have been spent on discovery and
motion practice, can further that goal. Three cases in which I personally
was involved demonstrate this point.
In September of 1983, an involuntary chapter 11 petition was filed
against Baldwin-United Corporation in the Southern District of Ohio.8
With over 200 subsidiaries, $9 billion in assets and $10 billion in debt, it
was the largest chapter 11 case ever filed at that time. Many of the major
banks east of the Mississippi were claimants. Initially, a ten-percent
recovery seemed optimistic, and the case was predicted to last a decade
or more.
5

U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED,
TERMINATED, AND PENDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS
ENDING
MARCH 31, 2009 AND 2010 tbl.F-8
(Mar.
2010),
available
at
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tabl
es/F08Mar10.pdf.
6
U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS CASES
COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING
MARCH
31,
2010
tbl.F-2
(Mar.
2010),
available
at
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/0310_f2.pdf.
7
U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS—ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED,
TERMINATED, AND PENDING UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS
ENDING
MARCH 31, 2009 AND 2010 tbl.F-8
(Mar.
2010),
available
at
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tabl
es/F08Mar10.pdf.
8
Erti v. Paine Webber Grp., Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig.), 765 F.2d 343, 345
(1985).
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The principal difficulty was that the bulk of the companies’ assets
were trapped in six insurance companies undergoing state rehabilitation
proceedings in Arkansas and Indiana, while the bulk of the debt was held
by the chapter 11 debtors. In January of 1985, the debtors and
rehabilitators reached an agreement on their respective claims. But the
path to a reorganization plan and the payment of creditors was blocked
by three major disputes: a $450 million IRS claim; a $560 million
secured claim held by a consortium of New York banks; and billions of
dollars in indemnification claims held by stockbrokers who were being
sued for securities fraud in federal court by Baldwin-United’s annuity
holders. These disputes had the potential to take five or more years to
litigate. The IRS audit process was estimated to last up to a decade. The
solution: each of these three major disputes was sent to mediation; they
were all resolved by the end of 1985. A plan was confirmed in March of
1986, and the case was largely wrapped up by the end of 1986, just over
three years after it was filed. Recoveries by unsecured creditors ranged
as high as seventy cents on the dollar, seven times what the creditors
would have been happy to receive at the outset of the case.
A more recent example is Pacific Gas and Electric Co., which filed
a chapter 11 petition in the Northern District of California on April 6,
2001.9 Although the genesis of the filing was the California energy
“crisis” of the previous year, the real fight was between the debtor’s
parent, Pacific Gas and Electric Corp., and the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC). The issue was not money—both the debtor’s plan
and CPUC’s competing plan would have paid all creditors in full.
Rather, the parties were deadlocked on a number of non-monetary
questions, the most divisive being the extent to which the CPUC would
continue to be the regulatory authority for the utility, as opposed to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
The parties spent approximately seven months and millions of
dollars preparing for and then trying a contested confirmation hearing
involving competing plans. After twenty-eight days of trial with
seemingly no end in sight, the matter was submitted to judicially
supervised mediation in March of 2003. Three months later, a deal was
reached that allowed a plan of reorganization to be confirmed by the end
of December of 2003.
There is no question that this settlement cut months off of the plan
confirmation process and years off of the inevitable appeals from a plan
confirmation order, not to mention multiple millions of dollars in fees.
But would even more time and money have been saved had the
9

In re P. Gas & Elec. Co., 263 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001).
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mediation process been started in a serious way almost from the outset of
the chapter 11 filing? As the mediator in that case, I have no doubt that
it would have.
A smaller but perhaps more representative example is presented by
Crescent Jewelers. When it filed its chapter 11 petition in the Northern
District of California in August of 2004, the company had approximately
103 stores and $140 million in annual revenues.10 Harbinger Capital
Partners Master Fund I bought Crescent’s parent company, Friedman’s,
Inc., which had filed its own chapter 11 case. Crescent owed Friedman’s
some $42 million. Harbinger acquired $20 million of Crescent’s trade
debt after Crescent’s chapter 11 case was filed. In doing so, it controlled
the majority of Crescent’s $96 million in total unsecured debt.
Beginning in 2005, Crescent put itself up for sale. When the only bidder
turned out to be Harbinger, Crescent resisted. Harbinger then pursued an
aggressive litigation strategy, objecting to the debtor’s motion to extend
its exclusive right to file a plan and filing a motion to appoint a trustee or
examiner. The relationship between the parties and the court quickly
deteriorated to a point that the presiding judge took the extraordinary
measure of revoking the telephonic appearance privileges of Harbinger’s
counsel, and threatening to revoke their right to appear in the case at all.
In an attempt to end the fighting, the judge directed the parties to
mediation. After a one-day session, an agreement was reached whereby
Harbinger ended up owning Crescent in exchange for dropping its claims
and making a substantial cash infusion into the company. A plan
implementing this agreement was confirmed less than two months later.
Through the mediation process, the parties recognized their own selfinterests and avoided the additional fees and inevitable loss of value that
a protracted fight would have brought.
Early initiation of the mediation process can be particularly
effective in dealing with multi-party disputes such as Ponzi schemes. In
Ponzi scheme bankruptcy cases, the trustee typically will bring dozens, if
not hundreds, of preference and fraudulent transfer suits. Particularly as
to preferences, it is difficult if not impossible to explain to defendants
(even in non-Ponzi cases) why they are being sued for receiving money
they were lawfully owed.11 In Ponzi schemes, it is even more difficult.
10

Crescent Jewelers Files for Bankruptcy, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2004, 8:21 AM),
available at www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2004/08/09/daily36.html?page=all.
11
See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547 (providing for the avoidance of preferential transfers), 548
(providing for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers) (Westlaw 2012). Grossly oversimplified, if an
insolvent debtor paid or transferred property to a creditor shortly before a bankruptcy case was filed,
section 547 allows the debtor in possession or trustee to “avoid” the transfer in order to foster
equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors. Section 548, again quite simplified, allows the
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Preference defendants, who may have received only a small portion of
their initial investment back, often feel outraged that they are now being
sued to surrender what little they have recovered, particularly if it is
unlikely they will recover more than a fraction of what they are owed.
Moreover, the people who invest in Ponzi schemes are often
unsophisticated and sometimes just plain odd, which may increase the
level of emotional reaction when they are sued. They also may be broke.
There is no one correct way for the court to handle a mass of
lawsuits with angry defendants. One useful approach, however, is to set
them down for status or scheduling conferences spaced in one-hour
increments with fifty cases (or as many people as the courtroom will
hold) every hour. At the status conference(s), the court should begin by
explaining the basics of preferences and fraudulent transfers, which
many of the defendants (often representing themselves) may not
understand. The court might then propose the following procedure: (i)
the trustee or plaintiff is directed to tender an initial disclosure of
evidence he intends to rely upon in his case-in-chief within ten days (if
he has not done so already); (ii) the trustee (plaintiff) is directed to make
an offer of settlement to each defendant within twenty to thirty days after
making his initial disclosure; (iii) within ten days thereafter, each
defendant will respond with a good faith counteroffer; (iv) within another
twenty days, the trustee (plaintiff) will send a letter to the court
indicating that the parties have done as the court directed (without saying
what the offers and counteroffers are). The defendants will not be
required to make an initial disclosure or file an answer until the
foregoing preliminary settlement process is completed.
If the parties have settled, the trustee shall take whatever action is
necessary to formalize the settlement. If the parties have not settled, the
court will direct the defendant to file an answer or other responsive
pleading to the complaint, tender initial disclosures, and appear at a
continued status conference to set discovery cut-off dates and address
other pretrial matters. Many of these lawsuits will settle in the
preliminary settlement phase. Those that do not can be sent to mediation
after discovery is completed. The odds are excellent that none of them
will ever be tried.
If the court is unable or unwilling to be involved in this pretrial
process, then a mediator can be appointed to handle the preliminary
settlement phase and, ultimately, to mediate any cases that have not

debtor in possession or trustee to avoid a pre-bankruptcy transfer that the debtor made either for less
than reasonably equivalent value while the debtor was financially impaired, or with actual intent to
hinder delay or defraud creditors.
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settled as of the close of discovery. Submitting a dispute to mediation
will not work miracles. It will not bring about instant peace or an
immediate resolution of all problems surrounding a troubled company.
But a mediator can focus the parties’ attention on reconciling their
differences rather than pursuing litigation, thus potentially taking years
off of the reorganization process and saving everyone a great deal of
money. It is important to involve the mediator early on, and it is most
efficient if she is assigned all of the cases. As is true in any other
commercial bankruptcy, it is important that the court direct the parties to
attempt to settle their differences before large sums of money are spent
preparing for trial.
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